

28 November 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]
Office of General Counsel

FROM: [redacted]
Chief, Community Security Group
Room 3E05 [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted] Study on Compartmentation

1. As the Security Advisor on [redacted] group working toward implementation of [redacted] proposals to reconstitute our compartmentation programs, I am concerned about possibly unanticipated security consequences. Your assistance is requested in connection with structuring alternative corrective actions.

2. My concern stems from the following:

a. At the present time the E.O. 10450 permits the granting of clearances to Confidential, Secret and Top Secret material based upon less than a hard and fast standard. [redacted]

[redacted] We have serious concern about the worth of such actions since they do not guarantee so much as assurance that the individual is who he claims to be.

b. E.O. 12036 charges the DCI with establishing standard procedures to protect intelligence, and intelligence sources and methods.

c. E.O. 12065 requires that the DCI publish classification guides in the area of intelligence sources and methods.

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d. Adoption of [] proposal will result in a considerable volume of intelligence material being removed from protection of our compartmentation programs and made potentially available to anyone with a Secret or Top Secret clearance.

e. There continues to be growing pressure in the Community for some sort of standard security guides of how to protect intelligence materials - as a category of material.

f. There is no definition of what is or could be defined as National Foreign Intelligence as a separate or separable category of material within the broad class of National Defense Information.

g. There is an exemption of the CIA and the IC in the latest draft of an E.O. replacing 10450 Personnel Security Program for access to sensitive materials. This leaves us without any guidance as to what the criteria is for Background Investigation.

h. There is no requirement that a secrecy agreement must be executed prior to access to classified material. This is particularly relevant when we look at the great amount of intelligence that could flow to civil agencies (Commerce, Interior, etc.,) if the [] proposals are adopted.

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3. Therefore, I am searching for assistance in establishing:

a. A uniform definition of National Foreign Intelligence (NFI) so that I would have a better chance of advising people on how to protect it.

b. A uniform security criteria for access to NFI. Something that may be a bit lower than DCID 1/14 requirements for access to Special Compartmented Intelligence but a bit higher than Defense's criteria for access to Top Secret.

c. A government wide requirement that a secrecy agreement must be executed as a condition precedent to access to classified NFI.

4. Would you be able to point me in the proper direction to see if any work has been done or is in progress toward identifying NFI or whatever it is that the DCI is supposed to protect and provide command standards of protection for.

5. Would you be able to determine if any action has been taken or is contemplated in connection with the August 1977 draft revision of E.O. 10450 which the Civil Service Commission submitted to the OMB. If this revision might be moved from the bottom of the file in the near future, then the DCI had better get moving on preparing his own since the IC is exempt.

6. Would you be able to point one in the direction of anyone on your staff that may be addressing the requirements for or proposals about a secrecy agreement as a condition for access to NFI.

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